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Abstract 
This article reports the first in-depth account of anti-social behaviour (ASB) victims' 
perspectives of using the Community Trigger case review in England. Semi-structured 
interviews explored whether victims perceived the Community Trigger to stop the 
persistent, long-term ASB they were experiencing and how they navigated the activation 
process. Attention was paid to whether the victims were satisfied with the response 
they received from the authorities and if they felt empowered by the legislation. The 
research provides detailed descriptions of victims' experiences of this policy and 
discusses the implications for policy reform. The results suggest that repeat secondary 
victimisation is a risk for victims of ASB that activate the Community Trigger. 
Resultantly, a range of empirically-driven policy recommendations are provided to 
improve frontline practice relating to case review procedures and communicating with 
victims, in order to protect victims of ASB from additional harm. 




This paper reports the first, and so far only, research into anti-social behaviour (ASB) 
victims’ experiences of utilising the Community Trigger case review. The study offers a 
qualitative understanding of what it means to be a victim of ASB having gone through 
the Community Trigger process, utilising critical victimology as a theoretical lens. The 
data presented in this article originate from interviews with ten victims of long-term 
ASB who activated the Community Trigger in one locality in England. The purpose of 
this study was to assess whether the implementation of this new policy has had a 
positive impact from a victim’s perspective and whether it fulfils the political rhetoric of 
‘putting victims first’. 
The legal definition of ASB in England and Wales is ‘conduct that has caused, or is 
likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person’ (Anti-Social Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Act 2014, Section 2 (1a)).1 
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This flexible definition encompasses a wide variety of criminal and sub-criminal 
behaviours perceived by the victim to cause a problem, such as noisy neighbours. ASB 
remains a substantial concern; latest figures from the Crime Survey for England and 
Wales show that 39.6 per cent of people experienced/witnessed ASB where they live, a 
record high, and 1.5 million incidents of ASB were recorded by the police (Office for 
National Statistics, 2020; 2019). We know from British Crime Survey data that the 
personal characteristics associated with individuals most likely to perceive high levels 
of ASB are: living in the 10 per cent most deprived areas, being unemployed, are social 
renters and are victims of crime (Flatley et al., 2008).  
Punitive mechanisms to govern nuisance behaviour, particularly in a social housing 
context, grew throughout the 20th century (Card, 2006). However, contemporary ASB 
policy embedded within the criminal justice system was first introduced through the 
Crime and Disorder Act (1998) by the New Labour government. The focus of this 
legislation was the re-moralisation of socially and economically marginalised 
communities and the regulation of nuisance behaviour (Garrett, 2007), which saw the 
creation of a vast array of tools and powers to tackle behaviours ranging from verbal 
abuse to fly-tipping. New Labour continued to focus on ASB governance throughout 
their time in office with revisions and additions to the original measures through the 
Police Reform Act (2002) and Anti-Social Behaviour Act (2003), which produced a 
legislative Behemoth. When the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government 
came to power in 2010, existing ASB legislation was modified and streamlined through 
the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014), which is still in force under 
the Conservative government of today. The reforms came with a greater emphasis on 
victims of ASB with the commitment to ‘put victims first’ (Home Office, 2012). This 
approach was chiefly in response to numerous high-profile tragedies involving 
vulnerable and repeat victims,2 and was a departure from the perpetrator-centric 
policies of the past such as Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (Heap, 2016).  
The ‘Community Trigger’ was introduced as the flagship victim-focused policy in 
2014. It acts as a mechanism for victims to request a case review if they believe they 
have not received a satisfactory response to their complaints. To prompt this, the case 
must meet a locally determined reporting threshold within a defined timespan. Home 
Office Guidance (2019a) suggests this should be no higher than three complaints in a 
six-month period, with each ASB incident having been reported within one month of it 
occurring. If the threshold is met, a formal multi-agency case review meeting is held 
which elicits the production of recommendations and an action plan to tackle the ASB 
in question. The relevant authorities involved in the meeting, which must make 
provisions for this process are: the district/unitary or London borough council, the 
police, the relevant clinical commissioning group, and co-opted social housing 
providers (Home Office, 2019a). 
The Home Office (2013) reported on the Community Trigger trials, examining four 
areas in England. Telephone interviews were conducted with ten participants across 
the sites that had tested the Community Trigger. The findings suggested that the 
Community Trigger had been successful at stopping ASB in difficult cases; victims were 
impressed with how quickly action was taken and felt empowered by the chance to 
challenge the previous lack of response. However ASB Help, the national charity that 
supports victims of ASB, has uncovered a contradictory picture by gathering data from 
all local councils and common themes from their casework. The work suggests that: 
poor publicity has resulted in many eligible victims being unaware of the policy, there is 
widespread confusion about how to activate it, and statutory guidance to make the 
process accessible to victims has been ignored (ASB Help, 2016). A detailed critical 
appraisal of the Community Trigger is provided by Heap (2016), which highlights issues 
with the construction and communication of the local reporting threshold, the 
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preoccupation with satisfaction, and how it fails to coalesce with perpetrator-focused 
ASB policies. 
Victims’ Experiences of Anti-Social Behaviour Policy  
Critical victimology focuses on the multifarious interrelationships between the law, 
state and social actors to better understand the process of being a victim (Mawby and 
Walklate, 1994). It highlights the subjective and variable acknowledgment of 
victimhood and contends that cultural, ideological and socio-economic factors are 
central to the understanding of victimisation (McGarry and Walklate, 2015). This 
provides an appropriate analytical framework through which to examine victims’ 
experiences of the Community Trigger, in relation to politicisation, victim 
responsibilisation, community empowerment, and funding. 
The idea that criminal victimisation could be politicised was first discussed by Miers 
(1978), who noted how politicians prioritised victims' services as a tactic to secure 
popular favour, especially during election campaigns. Victim-related criminal justice 
policy has developed with increased momentum over the past four decades (Davies et 
al., 2017); however, many policies have been considered symbolic (Weed, 1995), 
leading scholars to question the sincerity of such initiatives (Williams, 1999). Duggan 
and Heap’s (2014) work suggests the relationship between the state and social actors 
has changed because of the way the politicised victim agenda was accentuated in the 
UK after the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government came to power in 
2010. This shift embraced victim-centred policies and served to responsibilise victims, 
emphasising the necessity for victim investment in order to achieve justice. According 
to Garland (2001), responsibilisation strategies have been employed in a crime control 
context since the 1980s.  Essentially, this approach ‘promotes a new kind of indirect 
action, in which state agencies activate action by non-state organizations and actors’ 
(Garland, 2001: 124). This diffuses criminal justice responsibilities onto a wide range 
of actors, with the intention of persuading them to fulfil a specific role. 
Responsibilisation is evident in the Community Trigger, as victims are required to apply 
for a case review to be undertaken, rather than the authorities commencing 
proceedings themselves or resolving the issue satisfactorily following an initial public 
report. 
Duggan and Heap (2014) propose that navigating an increasingly bureaucratic 
criminal justice system, especially when a victim is responsibilised for taking action, 
has the potential to create additional emotional distress. This is known as secondary 
victimisation, which occurs as a result of negative experiences when engaging with the 
criminal justice system (Walklate, 2007). Most research into secondary victimisation 
has focused upon violent crime, but the concept can be applied to an ASB context. 
Secondary victimisation is strongly predicted by outcome satisfaction (Orth, 2002), 
which is pertinent to the creation of the Community Trigger as a mechanism to secure 
victim satisfaction. Existing research into ASB victimisation suggests that victims have 
not enjoyed straightforward nor satisfactory experiences when engaging with the 
authorities, thus demonstrating secondary victimisation. Research by Millie et al. 
(2005) shows that victims found reporting ASB incidents to the authorities was a 
‘pointless exercise’ because they did not care and/or did not have the resources to 
tackle the problem. This made victims feel powerless and lacking control. Similarly 
work by Heap (2010) also found: barriers to reporting, mistrust in the authorities, and 
dissatisfaction with the results of reporting ASB incidents. Victims’ lack of confidence in 
the authorities was also highlighted by Casey and Flint’s (2007) research. They found 
the agencies were dismissive of victims’ reports, which resulted in subsequent non-
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reporting. Secondary victimisation and dissatisfaction towards the state’s responses to 
victims have also been uncovered when the experiences of criminal victimisation have 
been studied (see Shapland, 2018). Together, these bodies of work evidence how the 
state’s criminal justice policies have struggled to sufficiently meet victims’ needs when 
responding to both criminal and sub-criminal behaviour. 
The policy rhetoric associated with the Community Trigger asserts that it was 
devised to empower communities to demand the authorities to take action, with the 
control of public services devolved to a local level (Home Office, 2012). However, the 
social actors and laws involved in administering justice for victims of ASB is now more 
complex than ever. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act (2011) introduced 
politically-affiliated, elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to devise local 
policing plans, set local budgets and hold chief constables to account on performance. 
This development added another partisan player into the ASB management context 
and brought added concerns about the extent they would reflect local interests (Mawby 
and Smith, 2013). PCCs play a key role in allocating funding, with the obligation to 
commission local victims' services delegated under their control. However, the financial 
resources allocated to provide these services do not extend to victims of ASB (Ministry 
of Justice, 2013). ASB Help (2019) exposed the contradictions of this funding model by 
highlighting how 37 per cent of PCCs state that victims of ASB are a priority in their 
local Police and Crime Plans because it is often a significant local concern, despite 
receiving no specific funding to operationalise this pledge. Subsequently, the lack of 
funding allocated by the Ministry of Justice to PCCs to assist ASB victims reflects the 
reality of their comparatively low political status, which contrasts the policy rhetoric that 
espouses prioritisation.  
Pursuing a community-led approach through the Community Trigger also fails to 
acknowledge the diverse nature and needs of communities. It assumes that all 
communities have a positive relationship with the authorities, whereas evidence 
suggests some communities at risk of ASB have lost confidence in statutory crime 
control agencies (Casey and Flint, 2007). Consequently, the Community Trigger may 
disproportionately benefit stable, middle-class communities which are more likely to 
act (Hancock, 2006). This notion is paradoxical because we know that the greatest 
amount of ASB victimisation takes places in the most socio-economically 
disadvantaged communities (Flatley et al., 2008), hence the construction of the policy 
itself may not be an appropriate solution for the victims that need it most. 
This study provides an original insight into how victims of ASB have experienced 
using the Community Trigger as a means to address their victimisation. The research 
examines the Community Trigger process from a policy perspective; assessing how the 
design of the policy shapes victims’ interactions with the state in order to understand 
how the state-victim relationship affects their experiences of victimisation. 
Methodology 
Qualitative research was undertaken to elicit detailed information about victims’ 
experiences of activating the Community Trigger. The study was conducted in one local 
authority area in South West England, where the Community Safety Partnership 
commissioned and funded the project. The area combines urban and rural locales, with 
some ward areas facing high levels of deprivation and inequality (Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government, 2019). The Community Trigger threshold for 
activation in this locality was three incidents in the last six months, and if more than 
five people had made reports about the same incident in the past six months. 
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Data were collected through semi-structured telephone interviews involving ten 
participants that lasted between 25 and 90 minutes, with the average being 45 
minutes. The sample was drawn from victims that had activated the Community Trigger 
in the Community Safety Partnership area. However, recruitment was extremely 
challenging. First, due to data protection regulations, the local council had to obtain 
permission from individuals that had activated the Community Trigger to pass their 
contact details to the research team. The involvement of the local council at this stage 
may have discouraged participation, especially if the Community Trigger was activated 
due to dissatisfaction with the local council's responses to ASB. Second, when contact 
details were received several individuals were too afraid to take part due to the fear of 
being identified by their ASB perpetrator(s), despite assurances of confidentiality and 
anonymity. The victims of ASB in this sample can be considered a hard to reach group, 
therefore participants were self-selecting and not necessarily representative of the 
population. Assembling a larger sample would have been beneficial, however there was 
evidence of conceptual density across the themes generated (Nelson, 2016) as well as 
congruence to existing work by ASB Help (2016). All victims' narratives are important 
given the 'individual, idiosyncratic experience' of victimisation (Green and Pemberton, 
2018: 77) and this work provides significant initial insight into the Community Trigger 
process from victims' perspectives. However, the small sample size in combination with 
it being derived from one location means the implications of these findings are not 
transferable to all victims' experiences of using the Community Trigger, according to 
Lincoln and Guba's (1985) evaluative criteria for assessing qualitative research. 
Nevertheless, the conceptual density highlights common experiences that require 
further investigation on a larger scale. 
The sample reflected a range of socio-demographics and comprised different 
genders (seven females and three males); a mixture of social housing tenants, private 
tenants and owner occupiers; and some vulnerable individuals due to ongoing physical 
and/or mental health problems. All participants described severe cases of ASB; 
multiple incidents, increasing in severity and frequency, and over a long period of time. 
Most ASB incidents were neighbour-related or linked to targeted and sustained 
harassment, including a combination of threats, bullying, and criminal damage. The 
remaining participants experienced ASB that occurred in public spaces, such as 
drinking/drug dealing and noise issues. Participants' cases ranged from between one 
and 12 years, with the majority having suffered for around four-five years. In all 
instances, the behaviour had a substantial impact on victims’ lives; regularly affecting 
daily routines and participants' physical and/or mental health (see Heap, 2020).  
Every participant reported their victimisation numerous times to a range of 
authorities including: the police via 999 and the non-emergency number, the local 
council (including housing, noise pollution and councillors), social housing providers 
and the RSPCA. All made multiple reports by telephone, as well as online forms and 
email. Commonly no action was taken, regardless of the agency reported to. This lack 
of response manifested in a variety of ways including: call handlers hanging-up, no 
response to messages/emails, and multiple requests for assistance being declined or 
ignored. Participants spoke about being ‘bounced’ between the authorities with the 
police advising individuals to call the local council and vice versa, which resulted in the 
ASB remaining unchallenged and ongoing. There were accounts of poor relationships 
with frontline personnel, especially police and housing officers. This included 
suggestions of rudeness, sarcasm and arrogance, with requests for meetings regularly 
refused. Participants felt they were not listened to and were made to feel that they 
were moaning about their situation. Consequently, all participants demonstrated 
secondary victimisation through the reporting process and their contact with the 
authorities before activating the Community Trigger. Ultimately, the sample contained 
p. 6. Anti-social behaviour victims' experiences of activating the 'Community Trigger' case review 
© 2021 The Author People, Place and Policy (2021): Early View, pp. 1-14 
Journal Compilation © 2021 PPP 
the type of ASB victims the Home Office say the Community Trigger was designed to 
protect. 
The interviews were audio recorded, transcribed and thematically analysed to 
identify recurring patterns and key topics. Congruence of the experiences between 
participants produced ‘thick data’, which provides an in-depth understanding of their 
experiences of the Community Trigger policy. Ethical approval was granted by the 
author's institution, with the names presented in this paper representing pseudonyms.  
Victims’ Experiences of Activating the Community Trigger 
Activation and Expectation 
Prior to activating the Community Trigger, none of the participants were aware of the 
policy and the opportunity it affords for a case review. This is unsurprising given a 
YouGov poll commissioned by ASB Help found that just three per cent of people had 
heard of the Community Trigger, with the information posted on only 16 per cent of 
Police and Crime Commissioner websites (ASB Help, 2016). Four participants stumbled 
across the information themselves online, whereas the remainder were informed by 
officers from a range of authorities (an MP, local councillor, housing and police). The 
actual process of activating the Community Trigger was praised as being 
straightforward, through an accessible online form or by telephoning the number on the 
website. However, all the participants agreed that once they had read about the 
Community Trigger, their expectation of a solution was raised considerably. Claire said: 
“I mean when you read about it, it seems like a brilliant thing and you think finally 
I might actually get face-to-face with the police that are dealing with anti-social 
behaviour, with the council person that’s dealing with anti-social behaviour and 
other parties that they have at these meetings, you’ll actually get to voice your 
opinion.” 
For participants, the Community Trigger appeared to provide an opportunity to have 
their voice heard. Seven participants believed the Community Trigger would: 
immediately escalate the case to senior officers, that they would be invited to and 
involved in the multi-agency case review meeting, any action would be taken quickly, 
that further evidence would be gathered about the case from neighbours, and that an 
investigation would take place to determine why nothing had been done about the ASB 
in the first place. For those seven participants, whose lives were being significantly 
disrupted by the ASB they were experiencing, the Community Trigger offered hope, 
which is arguably what the case review was designed to do. Participants’ high 
expectations of the Community Trigger reinforce the salience of the policy rhetoric that 
claims it will act as a 'safety net' and 'put victims first' (Home Office, 2012; 2019a). 
Communication 
The communication process throughout the duration of the Community Trigger was 
highlighted as a significant concern in participants’ accounts. Poor communication 
between the state and victims has been a longstanding concern for victimologists that 
have examined criminal victimisation (Shapland et al., 1985; Tapley et al., 2014). This 
research highlights how this problem persists and extends to the Community Trigger 
policy. For example, Laura stated that she did not hear anything after activation for 
three to four months and Rachel waited seven months. Even when cases did not meet 
the threshold, Melanie still waited eight weeks to find out. In five cases, participants 
stated that they did not receive a single point of contact for their case and two 
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disclosed that they were still not aware if the Community Trigger had been successfully 
activated or not. A common occurrence was that participants had to chase the 
authorities for updates about their case, similar to findings from Tapley et al. (2014). 
This highlights the extent of responsibility placed upon victims to pursue justice 
themselves and suggests that their contribution to the process entails more than 
simply 'activating' the Community Trigger. To illustrate, participants stated: 
“The fact is, I am the one that has raised the Community Trigger and it shouldn’t 
be me […] that is chasing up on this, it should be them coming to me to say 
they’ve seen an improvement, you know, we have done this.” (Laura) 
“Nobody ever comes back and tells us anything. We have not had any dealings, 
either verbally by phone, by email, with the person who was dealing with this 
whole case to date and I have been involved in it for [X] months now. I’ve 
[INCIDENT], I have had [INCIDENT], I have had [INCIDENT], you know. No one has 
ever come back to be with what they’ve done. I’ve just been left hanging there.” 
(Rachel) 
The two quotations characterise different approaches that victims took towards the 
Community Trigger process. For example, Laura constantly chased different officers, 
emailed for answers on the days they were told they would receive an update, and were 
repeatedly searching for a response. In contrast, Rachel articulated how they had ‘done 
their bit’ by reporting and believed it was the responsibility of the authorities to fulfil 
their role. Neither approach influenced the overall experience or action taken, as both 
strategies left participants frustrated with the continued inaction. These experiences 
reflect Duggan and Heap's (2014) suggestion that victims have to 'navigate' their way 
through a range of processes in order to achieve justice.  
Communication between actors also appeared problematic following the multi-
agency meeting. Claire explained how an intervention had been put in place, but this 
had not been communicated to a frontline officer who was managing the case. Lyn 
waited seven months for her meeting and when no further action was taken she did not 
receive an explanation about why the decision had been made, when Home Office 
guidance (2019a) states the victims must be informed about the outcome of a review. 
Further communication breakdown was evidenced through the handling of ongoing 
reports. Eight participants continued to experience ASB once the Community Trigger 
had been activated, which they kept reporting during the period of time between 
activation and being notified about the multi-agency meeting. No one was sure if the 
new incidents were being fed into their case review and how the reporting system(s) 
coalesced with the multi-agency meeting. Generally, all participants were very critical of 
the communications they had received about their case, demonstrating that even at 
the case review stage victims’ needs were not being addressed. For victims of crime, 
receiving little information about the progress of a case has been widely documented 
(see Tapley et al., 2014). The Victims’ Code (2015), produced by the Ministry of Justice, 
attempted to address this by setting a baseline of ‘key entitlements’ for victims, such 
as being kept informed about developments with their case. However, the Code 
focuses solely on victims’ interactions with the traditional criminal justice institutions, 
such as the police and courts, which does not reflect the wide range of actors involved 
in tackling ASB such as local councils and social housing providers. Consequently, 
victims of ASB are largely ignored by the Victims Code (2015). Where advances in 
communicating to victims have been made, such as the automated case tracking 
systems used by some police forces described by Wedlock and Tapley (2016), victims 
of ASB will only benefit if they reported the incident to the police, which means they 
miss out on this opportunity if they reported elsewhere. This research has shed further 
light on the inadequate reporting and recording structures of the agencies dealing with 
ASB post-Community Trigger activation. This adds an additional layer of complexity for 
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all involved and from the testimony of victims, heightens their suffering and frustration. 
This warrants comparisons to Walklate’s (2017) reminder about the tensions between 
the use of the term ‘victim’ and ‘complainant’. It appears the participants in this study 
were made to feel like a complainant, rather than their victim status being taken 
seriously and responded to accordingly. 
Poor communication from the authorities was also experienced by the participants 
when they reported the ASB for the first time, which is comparable to victims of crime 
(Shapland et al., 1985; Tapley et al., 2014). As a result, the participants in this 
research appeared to have suffered from three distinct phases of victimisation: the 
primary victimisation from the ASB itself, secondary victimisation through their initial 
unsatisfactory communication with the authorities, and finally repeat secondary 
victimisation through their experience of activating the Community Trigger and not 
achieving a resolution. This situation is particularly ironic given that the Community 
Trigger was purposely designed to help victims of ASB who were not being listened to 
and their ASB addressed in the first place. 
Satisfaction 
The primary purpose of the Community Trigger is to stop ASB that has previously been 
inadequately tackled. Participants were asked whether the policy had achieved its aim 
in their case, with the overwhelming majority suggesting it had not. Eight participants 
explained how their victimisation remained ongoing and had become worse. Where 
participants reported an improvement, this was often for a short period of time before 
the behaviour resumed. Issues with understanding the outcome of the Community 
Trigger appear inherently linked to the communication issues reported above, as well 
as outcome satisfaction. For example, one victim explained they received an outcome 
letter that said the authorities should have dealt with the issues more robustly. 
However, there was still no enforcement action taken and the ASB in question 
escalated. Generally, participants felt very dissatisfied with the whole Community 
Trigger process. Their disappointment was based on several factors, predicated by their 
heightened expectations after being told what the Community Trigger could do. First, 
participants were extremely unhappy about not being invited to the multi-agency case 
review meeting. Claire said: 
“I find that relaying information to someone […] doesn’t give a true feeling for 
exactly what’s going on, whereas if you can actually be there and say I am the 
victim here and this is what’s happening […] You should be able to give your point 
and you should be there and you should be part of what’s going on because it’s 
actually happening to you.” 
Second, all ten participants expressed a sense of frustration and disappointment 
with the process. Their feelings were epitomised by statements such as: 'I feel like I 
haven’t been taken seriously whatsoever' and 'it's like fighting a losing battle'. Overall, 
there was consensus that the process was a 'waste of time'. Third, the absence of a 
resolution also fostered a lack of trust in the authorities. This was exacerbated by the 
poor communication outlined above, as well as unanswered calls for help, unfulfilled 
commitments such as promised patrols not materialising, and being told incorrect 
information about their case. In contrast to Casey and Flint’s (2007) and Heap’s (2010) 
research, the participants in this study generally kept reporting incidents despite their 
lack of faith in the authorities. The participants had a noticeable appetite for 
enforcement action, which they said was due to the severity of the ASB they were 
experiencing. There was the sentiment from participants that they were ‘playing by the 
rules’ by reporting the ASB and trying to ‘do the right thing’, but they felt let down 
because no action was taken. Many believed this made them the target for further ASB 
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and that instead of helping them, activating the Community Trigger actually made them 
more vulnerable, which further eroded their trust in the authorities. 
Aligned to satisfaction is the issue of empowerment. As a consequence of their 
adverse experiences, it was clear that victims did not feel empowered by the 
Community Trigger. In all cases, participants said neither they (nor a representative) 
were given the opportunity to attend the multi-agency meeting. This contradicts Home 
Office Guidance (2019a) and made victims feel like they did not have a chance to 
articulate their side of the story. In addition, participants revealed their anger towards 
the Community Trigger and how they perceived the structure of the policy to create a 
conflict of interests. They felt it was unfair that the process was managed by the 
authorities themselves, essentially the people who the victims were dissatisfied with. 
Rachel said, 'we don’t want it dealt with by the people we’re complaining about […] it’s 
just a bit of a cover up, that is all it is'. Participants disliked having their complaint 
heard by the people they were complaining about because they believed they would not 
be treated fairly, which further compounded their lack of trust in the authorities. The 
ability for the authorities to effectively police themselves in the multi-agency meeting 
reflects how the Community Trigger policy was poorly conceived. A neutral party 
chairing proceedings would ameliorate these issues and provide a visible symbol of 
fairness, thus embodying the commitment to ‘put victims first’. 
There also appears to be a lack of central oversight to hold the authorities to 
account, by means of a complaints procedure should the outcome of the Community 
Trigger not be satisfactory. One dissatisfied participant had contacted Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (now Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire 
and Rescue Services), the Chief Constable, and the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (now the Independent Office of Police Conduct) who all referred the case 
back to the local authorities. This exacerbated participants' feelings of it being an 
unfair process. Home Office commitment to monitoring the Community Trigger also 
appears lax, which is evidenced through research by ASB Help (2019) that 
demonstrates local authorities are not completing their annual statutory reporting duty 
about the number of Community Triggers undertaken. The structure and oversight of 
the Community Trigger and the impact this has upon victims, which has been 
highlighted through this research, underlines that the policy fundamentally 
responsibilises victims to pursue justice (Duggan and Heap, 2014), with little support 
available from any quarters.  
Discussion and conclusion 
As critical victimology suggests, and this research affirms, the relationships between 
the law, state and social actors are central to understanding victimisation experiences 
(McGarry and Walklate, 2015). The political decision to prioritise ASB victims’ needs 
through the Community Trigger has highlighted a range of state-created processes that 
intersect to undermine the purpose of the policy. The wide range of actors involved in 
responding to ASB victimisation and implementing the Community Trigger shapes and 
complicates victims’ experiences. Even the introduction of Police and Crime 
Commissioners to hold police forces to account appears to have had little positive 
impact upon the experiences of ASB victims.  
This research demonstrates how victims suffer when the case review process is 
neither communicated nor executed effectively. The outcome of this poor practice is 
that victims experience additional distress and harm, which can be conceptualised as 
repeat secondary victimisation. This is because the case review process is the second 
time support and enforcement action has been pursued, and the second time they 
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have been let down by the state. What appears to make the situation worse for victims 
is that they perceive the Community Trigger will provide a solution because of the 
articulation of the policy rhetoric that action will be taken. Consequently, when the 
Community Trigger does not meet expectations, victims experience further upset and 
disillusionment with ‘the system’. The concept of repeat secondary victimisation is 
important and unique in relation to the Community Trigger because it reflects the 
contradictory nature of a review process designed to improve peoples’ lives, which 
made matters worse for those participating in this study. With the Community Trigger 
being relatively new, it appears effective procedures and practices are yet to be 
determined. These findings are significant because they contribute to a growing body of 
evidence that suggests politically-motivated victim policies are failing to deliver 
outcomes for victims (Tapley, 2005). 
There are additional socio-economic concerns that limit the potential of the 
Community Trigger. It is clear that ASB as a policy domain has reduced in priority since 
the mid-2000s, evidenced by the lack of funding provided to Police and Crime 
Commissioners to procure services for ASB victims (Ministry of Justice, 2013). This 
added layer of politicised bureaucracy has merely served to increase competition 
between different types of victims (Simmonds, 2016), rather than improving levels of 
service for all. Localised competitive funding practices related to PCCs contrast other 
areas of criminal justice that have seen significant centralised investment, such as 
child sexual exploitation (Home Office, 2018) and knife crime (Home Office, 2019b). 
Further, the UK government's decision to pursue austerity politics from 2010 onwards 
has resulted in the reduction of frontline police officers and staff in England and Wales 
by 18 per cent in 2018, equivalent to 200,000 personnel (Allen and Zayed, 2018). A 
one per cent rent reduction in social housing has also affected frontline ASB provision 
(Inside Housing, 2016). Plus, in the past decade local councils have lost 60p from 
every £1 received from the government to spend on services (Local Government 
Association, 2019). Substantial funding cuts across the main partner agencies 
responsible for tackling ASB are likely to contribute towards the poor initial responses 
to ASB reports and subsequent Community Trigger activations outlined by participants. 
When Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary conducted their first ASB inspection 
in 2010 they warned that it would be a mistake for chief constables and police 
authorities (the pre-cursor to Police and Crime Commissioners) to reduce the amount 
of work undertaken to tackle ASB (HMIC, 2010); a cautionary tale not heeded.  
A reduction in financial resources is not unique to ASB, but the consequent impact 
upon ASB victims' ability to obtain justice is likely to be significant, as this research has 
highlighted. Together, the lack of local infrastructure and the stymied spending power 
of the authorities demonstrate an abdication of responsibility for victims of ASB by the 
state. Through the construction of the Community Trigger policy, communities and 
victims have been responsibilised into seeking justice, but the government has not 
provided the resources for this to be realised. Ultimately, this leaves ASB victims in a 
vulnerable position without any means of redress and demonstrates that communities 
have not been empowered as promised by the legislation. This is particularly 
problematic when evidence suggests the most socio-economically deprived 
communities experience the greatest volume of ASB (Flatley, et al., 2008). The uneven 
distribution of ASB victimisation coupled with the notion that ‘socio-economic status 
and class are related to cultural and educational differences, which affect people’s 
ability to negotiate with those perceived to be in authority’ (Croall, 2017: 195) conspire 
to render vulnerable victims voiceless. Ultimately, the Community Trigger demonstrates 
how politically-driven decisions shape victims’ opportunities to achieve justice. 
The implications for policy reform from this research are numerous. First and 
foremost, from the evidence provided here, the authorities should respond sufficiently 
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to initial reports of ASB victimisation to prevent the need for the Community Trigger. 
Moving forward, local councils should adopt an approach to the Community Trigger that 
focuses on high quality fair processes to facilitate outcomes that are satisfactory to all 
parties. This could be achieved by better managing victims' expectations of the 
Community Trigger, with a clear indication provided to victims about what they can 
expect from activation. This transparency should form part of a communication strategy 
which includes: publicising the existence of the Community Trigger and being explicit 
about the processes involved, including suggested timescales and milestone feedback 
points, such as: the acknowledgement of activation, whether the review threshold has 
been met, notification of and invitation to the case review meeting, the outcome of the 
case review meeting, the recommendations, and the ASB action plan. To allow victims' 
voices to be heard, every effort should be made to ensure that the victim (or their 
representative) attends the case review meeting, which reflects Home Office Guidance 
(2019a). Finally, there should be a mechanism in place so that victims who are 
dissatisfied with the Community Trigger can seek further help and support. This is 
congruent with recent calls from ASB Help (2019) for there to be a designated Home 
Office position that provides strategic oversight and holds local officials to account. 
This research appears to show that activating the Community Trigger can inflict 
additional harm upon victims of ASB, which can be understood as a process of repeat 
secondary victimisation. Whilst the policy rhetoric pertains to prioritise victims' needs, 
in practice, the diffusion of responsibility from the state onto victims illustrates how 
victims are obliged to carry the burden of achieving redress through a system that is 
under-resourced and not operating effectively. Given that the Community Trigger was 
created following a number of high-profile fatal cases, the victims' experiences 
uncovered by this research are concerning and highlight that such tragedies could be 
repeated because the promised changes have not materialised.  
The findings provide the first in-depth understanding of victims' experiences of the 
Community Trigger, starting an evidence base. Further qualitative research into the 
lived experiences of ASB victimisation is required to ensure a richer understanding of 
the issues being faced, especially where there have been positive experiences of using 
the Community Trigger. More needs to be understood about the identities of ASB 
victims and how personal characteristics can shape victimisation experiences and the 
activation of the Community Trigger. This will enable the production of more nuanced, 
evidence-based criminal justice policies to better respond to victims' diverse needs. 
This is important because based on the current research evidence, there is still some 
way to go before the Community Trigger policy really does 'put victims first'. 
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Notes 
1 The definition of ASB is elaborated in 1b and 1c as it states: '(b) conduct capable of 
causing nuisance or annoyance to a person in relation to that person’s occupation of 
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residential premises, or (c) conduct capable of causing housing-related nuisance or 
annoyance to any person.' 
2 The high-profile fatalities associated with ASB cases involving criminal behaviour 
include: Fiona Pilkington who took her own life and that of her disabled daughter 
Francecca Hardwick in 2007 following persistent bullying and harassment 
(Independent Police Complaints Commission, 2011a). Suzanne Dow also committed 
suicide, in 2011, following harassment and abuse from her neighbours who were 
dealing drugs in the house next door (Telegraph, 2013). Finally, David Askew died of a 
heart attack in 2010 after being bullied and harassed by young people for more than 
ten years (Independent Police Complaints Commission, 2011b). See Heap (2020) for 
more details about the effects of ASB victimisation. 
* Correspondence address: Dr Vicky Heap, Department of Law and Criminology, 
Sheffield Hallam University, Collegiate Campus, Collegiate Crescent, Sheffield, S10 
2BQ. Email: V.Heap@shu.ac.uk  
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